Vũ khí Mỹ tràn ngập các linh kiện giả từ Trung Quốc
Theo Ủy ban Quân lực Thượng viện Mỹ, trong cuộc điều tra kéo dài một năm do Chủ tịch ủy ban, Thượng nghị sĩ Dân chủ Carl Levin, và Thượng nghị sĩ Cộng hòa John McCain khởi xướng, các chuyên gia đã phát hiện 1.800 vụ việc liên quan tới linh kiện giả, trong đó có linh kiện của các loại máy bay vận tải hạng năng của Không quân Mỹ, các trực thăng dùng trong các chiến dịch quân sự đặc biệt và máy bay do thám của Hải quân.
Bản báo cáo dài 112 trang của Thượng viện đã phác thảo những nguy cơ đối với an ninh quốc gia cũng như đe dọa an toàn trong hoạt động của quân đội do linh kiện nhái, có nguồn gốc từ Trung Quốc.
Số hàng giả trên bao gồm các linh kiện trong các Màng lọc giao thoa điện từ (EIF) sử dụng trong các chiến dịch ban đêm và vận hành các tên lửa trên trực thăng SH-60B của Hải quân Mỹ.
Ngoài ra, chúng còn bị phát hiện trong các con chip nhớ của hệ thống hiển thị trên các máy bay vận tải quân sự hạng nặng như C-17 Globemaster III và C-130J, các môđun phát hiện băng trên máy bay P-8A Poseidon, dòng máy bay Boeing 737 cải tiến có khả năng “săn” tàu ngầm và tàu chiến, của Hải quân Mỹ.
Báo cáo của Thượng viện Mỹ cho rằng Bộ Quốc phòng đã không lường được quy mô cũng như mức độ tác động tiêu cực của linh kiện điện tử giả đối với hệ thống phòng thủ quốc gia; đồng thời cảnh báo việc sử dụng các nhà phân phối độc lập mà không được kiểm soát chặt chẽ để cung cấp các linh kiện quân sự quan trọng đã dẫn đến những rủi ro không thể chấp nhận được đối với an ninh và an toàn quốc gia của Mỹ.
Report reveals fake chips in U.S. military hardware
LONDON – More than a million suspect counterfeit electronic components have been used in 1,800 separate cases of bogus parts affecting U.S. military hardware, according to a report produced by the Senate Armed Services Committee. The instances affect a number of military airplanes, helicopters, missile and electronic warfare systems.
The year-long investigation found large numbers of counterfeit parts – mainly from China – have been making their way into critical defense systems. A 112-report produced by the committee highlights cases in the U.S. Air Force’s largest cargo plane and in assemblies intended to go in special operations helicopters and U.S. Navy surveillance planes.
“Our report outlines how this flood of counterfeit parts, overwhelmingly from China, threatens national security, the safety of our troops and American jobs,” committee chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.) said, in a statement. “It underscores China’s failure to police the blatant market in counterfeit parts – a failure China should rectify,” he added.
The report concludes that China is responsible for more than 70 percent of the suspect components. The next two largest sources are the United Kingdom and Canada, although the committee identified instances were both these countries were reselling suspect counterfeit electronic components that originated in China.
Another conclusion was that the use of unvetted distributors to supply electronic parts meant that the Department of Defense (DoD) and defense contractors are frequently unaware of the ultimate source of parts used in defense systems and that this “results in unacceptable risks to national security and the safety of U.S. military personnel.”
The report also concluded that known instances of the use of suspected counterfeit components were not reported promptly to the DoD by contractors.
In one example the report says electronic parts supplier Hong Dark Electronic Trade (Shenzhen, China) supplied 84,000 suspect parts into the DoD supply chain. These components were then used in Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) intended to be deployed on a number of platforms; into assemblies for the Excalibur artillery projectile, for Navy submarine imaging systems, and the Army Stryker mobile gun.
Peter Clarke
5/23/2012
Counterfeit Chips Plague U.S. Missile Defense
Phony electronic parts have wound up at the U.S. Missile Defense Agency seven times in the past five years, its director told Congress on Tuesday. None of the fakes were actually deployed in active combat situations. But if they had, it might have imposed “a cost that could be measured in lives lost,” Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly warned the Senate Armed Services Committee Tuesday.
The flood of counterfeit goods creeping into military systems spotlights how vulnerable defense contractors’ supply chains have become, and how tricky it is to regulate them. Because the military tends to use its weapons systems for decades, its contractors have to turn to middlemen with stockpiles of obsolete parts.
For years, the Pentagon has been in overdrive trying to avoid bogus chips from tripping up its ballistic missile protection systems, even worse still, a nightmare scenario of “Trojan horse” circuits from being embedded in parts. But foreign chip-makers — especially those in China — are banging out these chips more and more cheaply, making it harder to track what’s getting mixed into military devices.
“There’s a lot of counterfeiting going on. It’s a clear and present danger. It is a threat to our troops and we are not going to let it go on,” vowed Committee chair Sen. Carl Levin.
In one case, 1,700 supposedly-new memory parts from an “unauthorized distributor” showed signs of previous use, prompting the Missile Defense Agency to have to call for almost 800 parts to be stripped from the assembled hardware. In a stockroom sweep, 67 frequency synthesizer parts had been found to have been “re-marked and falsely sold as new parts.”
The phony chips are another expensive headache for a Pentagon already facing big financial pressures. Dealing with the bogus goods cost the Missile Defense Agency about $4 million, according to the agency’s written testimony. Its director was not amused. “We do not want a $12 million THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] interceptor to be destroyed by a $2 part,” O’Reilly told Senate Armed Services Committee.
Phony chips have started infiltrating other military services, as well. An investigation by the committee, released yesterday, uncovered dozens of instances of suspect counterfeit electronic parts in defense systems and seven aircraft, including Lockheed Martin’s C-130J transport plane and Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft.
Perhaps most disturbing, some of those parts weren’t removed for a year and a half. It took Boeing that long to recommend that the Navy remove an ice detection module it ultimately decided had “a reworked part that should not have been put on the airplane originally,” according to Levin. The part, sanded down and marked to look new, was eventually traced back to a Japanese affiliate of a company in Shenzhen, China.
Levin vowed to push contractors to control their supply chain more tightly. He also said he would call for inspections of electronics shipments at the border — in a similar way to how “vegetables and dairy products” are examined. (Good luck with that.) “We are going to act. We cannot rely on the Chinese to act. That has been proven for a long period of time.”
Photo: Wikimedia Commons
